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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

THE SOVIET WORLD Page 4

Soviet propaganda against the Paris agreements.

ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE POSES DILEMMA FOR NON-COMMUNIST ASIAN POWERS Page 5

The Colombo powers' decision to include Communist China and North Vietnam among the 25 Asian and African states invited to a conference in Indonesia on 15 April has posed a dilemma for most of the non-Communist invitees. Peiping, on the other hand, has hailed the conference as a historic opportunity to "expand the peace area" and marshal anticolonial sentiment against the West.

PEIPIING'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE BURMA INCREASING . . . Page 8

As a result of Premier Nu's state visit to Communist China, Peiping has obtained advantages it can exploit to expand its influence among the Burmese. Nevertheless, the underlying factor governing Rangoon's attitude toward Peiping is apprehension, and Burmese leaders desire to maintain their present policy of neutrality.

PARIS ACCORDS MAY HINGE ON ARMS PRODUCTION POOL . . . Page 10

Final French ratification of the Paris accords may hinge on success of negotiations, scheduled to start on 17 January, for an arms production pool within the projected Western European Union. Unless an agreement assuring stronger controls over West German rearmament is in the offing by late February, the French Council of the Republic may throw the Paris accords back to the National Assembly, where approval on a second reading would face serious difficulties.

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CONTROL OF ARMY TIGHTENED . . Page 12

Peiping has modernized and centralized the army's command structure, has retired several military leaders from active commands, and has made the armed forces subordinate to other state organs. The aim clearly is to create an army fully responsive to the central leadership and to eliminate regional and personal loyalties.

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COMMUNISTS PUSH THE NATIONAL FRONT POLICY IN EASTERN
EUROPE Page 15

The National Fronts which have been developed in several of the Satellites during the past year as a major political aspect of the new course represent an attempt to gain greater popular support for the various Satellite regimes and parties.

SPECIAL ARTICLE. THE MOUNTING INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL
AMERICA Page 17

The outbreak of fighting at Villa Quesada in Costa Rica on 11 January came as the climax of Nicaragua's and Venezuela's nine-month-old "war of nerves" against the administration of Costa Rican president Figueres. The Costa Rican developments coincide with increasing signs of domestic instability in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama.

14 Jan 55

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

Page 3

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE SOVIET WORLD

Soviet propaganda media, apparently in response to moves to rearm Western Germany and statements made by Western spokesmen, continue to warn of the terrible consequences of nuclear warfare and to make charges of American aggressiveness. A Red Star article, broadcast on 8 January to Western Europe, pointed to the danger of nuclear warfare to small, thickly populated countries. One broadcast threatened Great Britain that in the event of another war, "all the consequences of atomic warfare will come crashing down on the British Isles," and another predicted that a war provoked by aggressive circles "will sweep onto the American continent as well."

Peiping seized upon the statements made by Admiral Radford in Seoul to comment that he "should have a look at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. . . while pressing for Japanese rearmament. This, perhaps, would give him some impression of what would become of America if it starts atomic war."

Moscow is also enlisting religion in its efforts to exploit fear and anxiety in the non-Communist world. A series of statements by the leaders of the Orthodox, Old Believers, Baptist, Soviet Moslem, and Jewish religious orders in the Soviet Union has been publicized in support of the Moscow conference declaration and against the Paris agreements. Concurrently, the French Communist spokesman, Courtade, seems to be calling for the extension of unity-of-action to Catholic working groups who, he says, "do not confuse religion with the temporal policy of the Vatican."

This is not the first time the Kremlin has adopted a humanitarian pose to dissipate fears of Soviet aggression and to create doubts about the wisdom of proceeding with Western policies. The present campaign, however, places more emphasis than heretofore on Soviet retaliatory capabilities--underlining the assertion that the USSR fights for peace from a position of strength.

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ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE POSES DILEMMA FOR
NON-COMMUNIST ASIAN POWERS

The Colombo powers' decision to include Communist China and North Vietnam among the 25 Asian and African states invited to a conference in Indonesia on 15 April has posed a dilemma for most of the non-Communist invitees.* They are reluctant to meet with Communist representatives, but find it difficult to abstain from a meeting attended by a substantial number of their fellow Asians and Africans. Peiping, on the other hand, has hailed the conference as a historic opportunity to "expand the peace area" and marshal anticolonial sentiment against the West.

While the non-Communist states can be expected to resist Nehru's or Chou En-lai's efforts to mold the conference, anti-Communist personalities attending the meeting will have to consult closely if they are to seize the initiative.

Seventeen countries approached by Indonesia before the Colombo powers' meeting at Bogor from 23 to 30 December apparently agreed informally to attend. But at least the Arab League states (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen) seem to have been led to believe that Peiping would not be invited and made the Communists' absence a condition of attendance. These states, as well as those closer to the West--Japan, Turkey, Iran, Thailand, the Philippines, Ethiopia, the Central African Federation, the Gold Coast and, presumably, Liberia--are generally conscious of the difficulties they court in attending a meeting with the Communists and are either awaiting or have sought Western advice. The initial reactions of the Arab states, however, indicate that they will be present.

The purposes of the conference, as set forth in the sponsoring prime ministers' communiqué of 29 December, are to promote good will and co-operation; to consider social, economic and cultural problems; to consider other problems of "special interest" to Asians and Africans, such as national sovereignty,

*Sponsors are Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan and Indonesia.

Invited are Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Central African Federation, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Yemen.

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racialism and colonialism; and to "view the position" of Asia and Africa and the contribution they can make to world peace and co-operation.

These purposes are deliberately vague; the five sponsors themselves have found it best to stick to noncontroversial subjects in their own meetings. What even Nehru has called the "odd assortment" of nations invited to Indonesia is likely to find that its clearest common denominator is only that these countries' differences from the European world are somewhat more obvious than their differences from each other.

The prime ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma originally entertained the idea of such a conference as a sop to the prestige-seeking Indonesians. India and Burma became actively interested in promoting it only in mid-December after Prime Minister U Nu had returned from his visit to Peiping, and it is fairly clear that U Nu and Nehru, with the Indonesians in tow, now conceive of the conference primarily as a means for promoting the idea of "peaceful coexistence," particularly between Communist China and the West.

No non-Communist invitee except India's satellite Nepal has yet reacted favorably to this conception. It is a view opposed by Pakistan and Ceylon, whose leaders prevented Nehru from citing his "five principles" of mutual noninterference and coexistence in their communiqué. Nations allied with the West--Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines--also have clearly indicated their intention to attack neutralism in any form.

The aims of others are more disparate. The attraction of the conference for the Arab states and Afghanistan is the opportunity to propagandize on behalf of special causes like the Palestinian refugee problem and Pushtoonistan. The Japanese are attracted by the chance to renew their Asian contacts and by the opportunity of displaying an "independent" foreign policy. Fear of renewing old antagonisms, however, will probably keep them from seeking a position of leadership.

In contrast to the hesitation and mixed counsels of the non-Communist world, Peiping, echoed by widespread Orbit propaganda, has enthusiastically greeted the proposed meeting. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly go to the conference with a definite and carefully thought-out program. Peiping broadcasts claim that the main issue of the conference will be colonialism and that its main purpose is the expansion of the "peace area." Peiping has already hinted that it favors participation of North Korea in the conference.

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Chou En-lai will probably attend in person, and is likely to try to attune his approach closely to those of India and Burma rather than present his program independently. The Chinese are presumably aware that an attempt to dominate the proceedings openly would probably turn Nehru against them and increase the hostility of the other non-Communists. The only anomaly in the over-all Communist attitude thus far has been the absence of comment from North Vietnam.

As yet, only Egypt has suggested even a somewhat hazy program for minimizing the Communists' chances for a diplomatic victory. However, none of the Arab states possesses the leadership necessary to make such a program effective, and other actual or potential anti-Communist countries suffer either from this disability or from close identification with the Western alliance systems. Pakistan's prime minister, Mohammad Ali, has expressed buoyant confidence that if all the anti-Communists attend the conference, they can "clobber" Peiping's representatives, but this statesman's past promises have exceeded his performance.

Unless, therefore, there is considerable unity of view and planning among the most vigorously anti-Communist leaders before the conference opens, Peiping may succeed in associating the conference result with its own objectives.

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PEIPIING'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE BURMA INCREASING

Sino-Burmese relations are closer than at any time in recent years as a result of Premier Nu's state visit to Communist China. In return for a pledge not to interfere in Burma's internal affairs and a promise to purchase a substantial quantity of rice, Peiping has obtained commercial and political advantages it can exploit to expand its influence among the Burmese.

Peiping's efforts to overcome Burmese suspicions first became obvious last spring with the signing of a Sino-Burmese trade agreement and Nu's adherence in June to Chou's "five principles" of coexistence. These efforts reached a climax during Nu's trip in December when the Chinese reaffirmed their adherence to the "five principles" of coexistence and agreed to purchase from 150,000 to 200,000 tons of rice annually during the next three years.

Despite his previous reservations regarding Chinese Communist intentions, Nu was obviously impressed. He returned to Rangoon extolling the virtues of the Mao regime and claiming that the assurances received constituted a triumph for Burma's neutral foreign policy. At the meeting of the Colombo powers in Indonesia in late December, Nu took the position that Burma's participation in the Asian-African conference was contingent on an invitation being issued to Peiping.

During his trip, Nu reiterated Burma's willingness to accept Chinese and Orbit goods in payment for rice. The Communists thus are presented with an opportunity to develop an important toehold in the Burmese economy. It is, moreover, a toehold that can be expanded if the Communists exploit Nu's agreement to the inauguration of air service, restoration of highway traffic, and development of other means of communications.

Peiping also stands to gain politically and economically from a Burmese promise to allow the establishment of a consulate general in Lashio in northern Burma. Not only is Lashio the southern terminus of the Burma Road, but it is located in the border area where the Chinese Communists have been attempting to increase their influence among various ethnic minority groups.

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For its part, Peiping has made no commitment on any matter the Burmese regard as sensitive. When pressed on such problems as the status of Overseas Chinese, border demarcations, and the disavowal of Burmese Communist insurgents, the Chinese either stalled or gave evasive answers.

Despite the increased cordiality in Sino-Burmese relations, the underlying factor governing the Burmese attitude toward Peiping is apprehension. After Nu's return a cabinet officer stated that since Geneva, his government had felt that it must "play safe" with its powerful neighbor. Moreover, it is fairly apparent that the Burmese hope Peiping's public denials of aggressive designs will serve as a safeguard to their independence.

There is little doubt that Burmese leaders want to maintain their present policy of neutrality. In this connection, U Nu has indicated a keen desire to visit the United States, apparently in the hope of effecting a rapprochement between the United States and Communist China.

In the meantime, the premier's trip has evoked an extremely favorable public response in Burma. A number of local editors fear Nu is leading the country "down a garden path" and that it will be difficult to counter the pro-Peiping sentiment his trip has generated. Peiping, by judicious exploitation of Burmese anxiety and its enhanced prestige in Burma, may be able gradually to restrict Rangoon's freedom of action in both domestic and foreign affairs.

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PARIS ACCORDS MAY HINGE ON ARMS PRODUCTION POOL

Final French ratification of the Paris accords may hinge on success of the negotiations, scheduled to start on 17 January, for an arms production pool within the projected Western European Union. Unless an agreement assuring stronger controls over West German rearmament is in the offing by late February--an uncertain prospect at present--the French Council of the Republic may throw the Paris accords back to the National Assembly, where approval on a second reading would face serious difficulties.

The current French proposal for an "Armament Agency" contains features objectionable to other WEU countries. It calls for an initial two-year period of voluntary participation in a pool covering both arms standardization and production; on 1 January 1957 the arms production programs of all WEU members would be co-ordinated under supranational control. This proposal is much closer to a similar project tentatively rejected at the London talks in October than France's partners had been led to expect. It calls, for example, for full British participation in the arms pool, despite Britain's firm stand against this in October. The French seem to be seeking to obtain EDC's advantages without its drawbacks.

Other aspects of the French plan involve the United States directly. Despite Washington's repeated rejection of the proposal, Mendes-France is pressing for American consent to funnel military aid to WEU countries through WEU machinery. All the other WEU countries are expected to oppose such a change in the present bilateral set-up. Mendes-France is also eager to prevent West Germany from getting control of atomic weapons. This may be an important element in the French position.

In view of strong reservations voiced by the Low Countries, particularly the Netherlands, France is prepared to start out with Italy and West Germany, and any Benelux countries willing to join. Current negotiations between Mendes-France and Premier Scelba appear to assure Italian participation. The West German government has its own plans for a pool project using the Coal-Steel Community as the instrument of control, and Mendes-France hopes to reach an understanding with Chancellor Adenauer in their negotiations beginning 14 January.

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The biggest stumbling blocks are expected to be Britain's refusal to sacrifice sovereignty and Dutch fears that the interests of small WEU members will be inadequately protected. A Dutch official has also expressed the view that Mendes-France's arms-pool proposals are mainly an attempt to provide an alibi in the event France fails eventually to ratify the accords. The British Foreign Office has indicated that though it considers the French proposal unworkable, it will take a constructive attitude toward working-group discussions and has urged the Dutch to do the same. The extent of British participation may determine the type of controls over arms production which will be accepted by the continental WEU nations.

The idea of stronger controls over West German rearmament is politically popular in France, and all non-Communist deputies favor the arms-pool concept as the surest way to control German arms production. The Paris accords provide only negative controls through an "Agency for the Control of Armaments" endowed with watchdog functions over levels of forces and the manufacture of certain prohibited arms. The current proposal implies the creation of a separate "Armament Agency," but Mendes-France has indicated that he hopes to consolidate both watchdog functions and positive controls in a single organization.

Since the National Assembly reluctantly accepted the Paris accords in December, Mendes-France has emphasized the necessity for some progress toward arms production control as well as toward East-West talks before the Council of the Republic votes on German rearmament. The council will probably object, however, to the fact that the present proposal envisages an initial period of two years without controls. The control plan will also be vulnerable on the ground that after the two-year initial period France will be deprived of its veto in the WEU. Furthermore, no amount of controls will eliminate the basic French fear that a rearmed and resurgent West Germany will eventually supplant France as the dominant military as well as economic and political power in Western Europe.

Though enough progress will probably be made by the WEU working group to convince the members of the French Council that further delay is unwarranted, time is running against the Paris accords as well as against Mendes-France's tenure in office. Until the decision is taken the danger remains that the accords may be thrown back to the assembly for a second reading, in which event ratification would face considerable difficulties.

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SECRET**CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CONTROL OF ARMY TIGHTENED***

Peiping has modernized and centralized the army's command structure, has retired several military leaders from active commands, and has made the armed forces subordinate to other state organs (see chart, p. 14). The aim clearly is to create an army fully responsive to the central leadership and to eliminate regional and personal loyalties.

Politburo member Liu Shao-chi's remarks in February 1954 about "independent kingdoms" enjoyed by the military presaged the retirement of certain leading army figures. Subsequently, the abolition of the six regional administrations reduced the power of those military leaders who had exercised civil as well as military authority in their administrations. The appointment of commanders of field armies and military areas to the regime's top military body further centralized power by requiring these officials to spend considerable time in Peiping, away from their command areas.

When Peiping's new government organization went into effect last September, many military leaders were assigned to the State Council and to the National Defense Council while a group of younger and lesser-known officers took over many command posts. Despite their retirement from active command, Communist China's old military heroes still appear to be in good standing with Mao and occupy positions of respect, if not of great authority, in the new government.

Recent speeches by military figures have stressed the need for further modernization of the People's Liberation Army and training along Soviet lines. This program has already resulted in reorganized and improved ground forces, and clearly aims to develop stronger naval and air arms.

The old concept of the Chinese Communist field army--as a semi-independent body occupying a particular area of China from which it recruited its manpower--appears to have been discarded. There were no deputies elected from field armies to the National People's Congress last September, whereas the "volunteers" in Korea and the six regional military commands

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sent representatives. However, there are indications that the functions of the regional military commands may have been changed. These commands may henceforth recruit and train manpower and then transfer their trainees to tactical units operating elsewhere in China.

Under Peiping's new constitution, military affairs have been subordinated in the government administration. The function of the old People's Revolutionary Military Committee has been divided between the newly formed Ministry of National Defense under the State Council and the National Defense Council headed by Mao Tse-tung.

Responsibility for building up the armed forces is invested in the State Council, which is defined as "the Central People's Government." This is carried out through the Ministry of National Defense, headed by Peng Teh-huai, who apparently is also commander of the armed forces. Thus the command functions as well as the administration of China's armed forces would seem to be under the Defense Ministry.

The general staff is now subordinate to the army rather than to the National Defense Council, indicating that responsibility for direct military planning is also under the State Council. Since the Ministry of Public Security falls under the jurisdiction of the State Council as well, all elements of the armed forces seem to be under the administrative organ of the state.

The National Defense Council, on the other hand, seems to be an extragovernmental advisory body and is responsible primarily to Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi.

In sum, it appears that considerable progress has been made in the past year toward establishing the armed forces in a subordinate position to the political apparatus. As older members of the military hierarchy die or become less active, personal and regional ties will be broken down and the new relationship between the armed forces and the government will become more binding.

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MILITARY COMMAND OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

1949

CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT COUNCIL

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY
MILITARY COUNCIL

GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
COUNCIL

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

Committees and Ministries

Regional Commands

1954

NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Mao Tse-tung

STANDING COMMITTEE OF
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL

STATE COUNCIL

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

Regional Commands

~~SECRET~~COMMUNISTS PUSH THE NATIONAL FRONT
POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE

The National Fronts which have been developed in several of the Satellites during the past year as a major political aspect of the new course represent an attempt to gain greater popular support for the various Satellite regimes and parties. They are founded on a contradiction, however, which can be expected to stunt their growth. The Satellite regimes are by definition regimes of total control, and they cannot make enough real concessions to stimulate the initiative and support which they seek.

The idea of the Front policy being followed in Eastern Europe is an adaptation of the successful tactics originally developed during the late 1930's in the countries of Western Europe. The present policy in Eastern Europe calls for two organizations: the National Front and the Communist Party. To enhance the Front concept, most of the Communist parties are called workers' parties.

Side by side with this emphasis on the Front there has been an increasing concern with some of the tactical caveats concerning the Front policy, laid down in 1935. Party leaders have warned in various ways against left sectarianism, over-estimating the degree to which the masses have been revolutionized, underestimating the importance of youth organizations, and adopting a disparaging attitude toward national independence.

The present objective of the Front is best illustrated in Hungary, where it has been touted as the social mechanism to achieve national unity and effective action through mass initiative. This differs from that of the immediate postwar National Fronts, which were successfully used to eliminate non-Communist opposition.

Last year Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary launched a concerted effort to revive the organizations of their moribund postwar National Fronts in order to broaden minority support for the established regimes. The Czech, Polish and Hungarian Fronts were prominently employed in national elections last autumn, and have been used to bolster major aspects of Orbit foreign policy. Czechoslovakia is exploiting religious leaders in Front activities more broadly than at any time in the past few years. Unlike those in the other Satellites, the Bulgarian Front continued to function, but at the moment lacks a clear direction. In Rumania, the Front concept has so far been ignored, but there is some evidence that it may be rejuvenated there.

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Within the Communist parties themselves the Communists also face the problem of injecting some enthusiasm into the left Social Democrats whom they assimilated in 1948. Since the party congresses last spring, disgraced politicians have been restored to minor public positions in Hungary and Rumania, and two assimilated left Social Democrats still in the Czech government have been promoted to the highest government and party levels.

Concurrently with this re-emphasis, the sharp distinction between left and right Social Democrats was redrawn in the Rumanian party statutes drafted last August, and widely publicized in Czechoslovakia by the treason trial of several right Social Democrats last autumn. The general treatment so far suggests a reapplication of the old Communist dictum that as Communists establish closer relations with left Social Democrats, they must increase the vigor of their attacks on the right.

There has been a noticeable tendency to soften the extreme demands for revolutionary vigilance which caused so many Communists heads to roll in the period from 1949 to 1952. Party officials imprisoned or disgraced at that time have reappeared in small numbers in the Satellites. At the party congresses, both Rakosi in Hungary and Chervenkov in Bulgaria tried to assess the vigilance concept more realistically by divorcing it from simple suspicion. The Polish and Hungarian attacks on malpractices of the security services are related to this shift. The Hungarian party has publicly expressed its concern about the effects of false arrest on party members and demanded that they be socially rehabilitated.

The Front is based on an underlying assumption that the Communists although in firm control remain a minority group in a fundamentally unsympathetic environment and that they must broaden their support. Like the economic concessions of the new course, the political concessions are limited; there is little attempt to disguise the ultimate goal of total Communization.

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THE MOUNTING INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The outbreak of fighting at Villa Quesada in Costa Rica on 11 January came as the climax of Nicaragua's and Venezuela's nine-month-old "war of nerves" against the administration of Costa Rican president Figueres. The Costa Rican developments coincide with increasing signs of domestic instability in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama.*

The rebel force now in action in Costa Rica is believed to consist of Costa Rican oppositionists and mercenaries, but the strategy and material support for the movement probably come from the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan governments. Despite Nicaraguan denials of involvement, the Organization of American States (OAS) voted unanimously on 11 January to send a special OAS investigating committee to Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

Nicaraguan president Somoza claims to have evidence that Figueres was implicated in last April's plot to assassinate him and seems intent on harassing Figueres out of office. Somoza told a Costa Rican emissary in mid-December that he would never enter into a rapprochement with Figueres. The authoritarian government of Venezuela, which hates Figueres for his close association with exiled Venezuelan oppositionists, is just as anxious to see Figueres fall. Other rightist regimes in the Caribbean area, including Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, are generally aligned with Nicaragua and Venezuela.

The arrival in Nicaragua on 2 January of Venezuelan military personnel and the flight on 6 January of seven Venezuelan C-47's to Nicaragua, possibly carrying arms to Costa Rican revolutionaries, immediately preceded the outbreak of fighting in Costa Rica. The Venezuelan foreign minister was extremely evasive about the planes in discussing the situation with Ambassador Warren on 8 January and remarked that Venezuela would recognize "within two hours" any new government following the overthrow of Figueres.

* See "Guatemala - Six Months After" in Current Intelligence Weekly of 31 December 1954.

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Five more Venezuelan C-47's were reported to have arrived in Nicaragua on 10 January. On the same day Somoza told Ambassador Whelan in Managua that he believed a Costa Rican revolt "by 100-percent Costa Ricans" will occur prior to 15 January. Somoza had previously promised the ambassador that he would warn him prior to any move against Figueres.

Internal Tension in Nicaragua

Since mid-December Somoza has repeatedly claimed knowledge of an assassination plot against him similar in nature to the April 1954 attempt on his life. He accuses die-hard members of the opposition Conservative Party who strongly oppose his plans to have himself re-elected in 1956, with assisting Figueres' agents. On 3 January Somoza stated that he had recently arrested 27 persons who had been sent from Costa Rica to assassinate him.

There may be some substance to Somoza's fears, since in early December a Costa Rican official visiting Panama commented that Somoza would soon be too "busy with his own back yard" to harass Costa Rica. On 3 January a prominent member of the Nicaraguan opposition Conservative Party declared that his party "is definitely planning a new revolution." Somoza has increased his security precautions and a vague uneasiness has become apparent in Managua. The National Guard, Nicaragua's only armed force, is believed loyal to the president and could probably suppress any attempted revolt.

Panamanian Stability Undermined

Despite rumors to the contrary, there is no evidence that any neighboring government was involved in the assassination of President Remon on 2 January.

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In any event Guizado lacks the personal following of his strong and popular predecessor. While the situation for the present seems quiet, differences between Guizado and some of Remon's adherents are already evident, and there is a possibility that the government coalition may eventually dissolve into personal factions. Rivalry may also be developing between the top commandants of the National Guard.

Stability in Honduras Still Precarious

The political honeymoon in Honduras which has prevailed during the month since Julie Lozano assumed full powers of state with the collapse of constitutional order on 6 December may now be drawing to a close. Reportedly, Lozano has already angered important politico-military figures, including ex-dictator and Nationalist Party chief Carias and former Reformist Party presidential candidate Williams, by denying them the political patronage they felt entitled to.

Among the Liberal Party members named to important posts, Lozano has included members of the conservative faction of the party hostile to the dominant radical group led by Ramon Villeda Morales, who received a plurality in the October presidential election. The Liberals, who are especially strong in labor, gave their initial support to Lozano with some misgivings and many are bitter over the employment of force and fraud against their candidates during and after the October elections. In Lozano's favor is the apparent strong support being given him by the majority of key army officers.

The Lozano regime is also harassed by critical labor and economic problems in the vital north coast area, which was crippled by a ten-week general strike last spring and by disastrous floods in the autumn. The area's largest employer, the United Fruit Company, has been forced to cut back its labor force radically. This has been a serious blow to the new and insecure anti-Communist labor organization which is under incessant attack from Communist labor elements.

Political Instability Growing in El Salvador

Recent indications suggest that an intense behind-the-scenes political struggle may be developing in El Salvador over the choice of a successor to President Oscar

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Osorio, whose term ends in September 1956. Osorio is reportedly insisting that the official presidential candidate be Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, his minister of education.

As a civilian and a leftist, Galindo is anathema to leaders of the politically important army.

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Osorio appears to be losing the confidence of other key army leaders, though still enjoying wide popular support.

Certain army leaders are also becoming apprehensive over what they consider the growing influence of leftists in the government. Although Osorio has followed a strong anti-Communist policy in the past, at least one and probably more Communists or pro-Communists remain on the government payroll.

The Osorio administration is further weakened by its virtual isolation from other Central American governments. Osorio is strongly distrusted by Presidents Castillo Armas of Guatemala and Somoza of Nicaragua, who feel he was sympathetic to the former pro-Communist government in Guatemala and is being influenced by Communists at this time.

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